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EFFECTS OF THE TREND TOWARD TIGHTENING 
ELIGIBILITY CONDITIONS FOR ENTITLEMENT TO 
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
Walter N. Adams 
Beginning in 1984, the Commissioner of the Georgia Depart-
ment of Labor, the administrator of the unemployment com-
pensation law in Georgia, announced a new policy that has been 
followed consistently in Georgia thereafter: Any increases in 
the maximum weekly benefit amount (MBA) for unemployment 
compensation must be funded or offset by tightening eligibility 
conditions. The intent of this policy was for each increase in 
the MBA to be self-funding, thus requiring no increases in 
unemployment tax. The State of Georgia carefully adhered to 
this policy until the 1994 session of the state legislature, when 
a two step increase in the MBA was granted without a 
concomitant source of funding in the same bill. Other states have 
followed this identical policy for several years. Although it has 
had a positive effect on the perception of the unemployment 
insurance system as a "no fault" program, this unwritten and 
often unspoken policy has had minimal effect upon trust fund 
balances. In Georgia, the policy contributed very little to the 
goal of increasing trust fund reserves. Net overall increases in 
trust fund balances over the last twenty years were caused 
primarily by economic conditions and not by changes in 
eligibility conditions. It may even have had an adverse effect 
on public welfare programs. 
In legislative bodies the different changes in unemployment 
compensation eligibility conditions were well-received, with little 
opposition. Tightening of eligibility conditions was perceived 
by legislators and many public interest groups as a justifiable 
taking from those not deserving of receipt of unemployment 
benefits. For example, in Georgia the 1987 change from a range 
of weeks' penalty to a total loss of benefits for those determined 
to have been fired for cause was applauded by most legislators. 
A typical response was that those people never were intended 
to be protected by the safety net because they contributed to 
their own unemployment. 
A review of disqualification and eligibility conditions over the 
past two decades reveals a gradual tightening of eligibility 
conditions. This trend is reflected in most states' unemployment 
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compensation laws over this same period of time. It is not merely 
coincidental that major changes in federal unemployment law 
occurred during this time. For example, the 1970 comprehensive 
changes in Pub. L. No. 91-373, known as the Employment 
Security Amendments of 1970, and in Pub. L. No. 94-566, known 
as the Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, 
dictated substantial changes in state law and created large new 
classes of eligible claimants who could receive unemployment 
compensation. Both of those federal laws significantly raised 
the taxable wage base, but that tax increase mainly was 
designed to refurbish state trust funds which suffered during 
recessions in the late 1960s and early 1970s and did not cover 
fully the anticipated cost of benefits for the new classes of 
workers to whom coverage was extended under the federal law. 
Those recessions were so close together that many state trust 
funds had difficulty overcoming large payouts that had forced 
many states to borrow from the federal government to pay 
benefits. 
Most states have replaced the range of weeks forfeiture which 
predominated many years ago with a more severe complete 
disqualification which can be purged only by securing other 
employment, working a specified duration, and then losing that 
job through no fault on the part of the individual. States first 
began to apply this concept to disqualifying quits, then extended 
it to disqualifying discharges. These are simply the primary 
examples of the types of changes which have occurred. Other 
categories of changes in eligibility conditions which were 
tightened by states will be discussed in greater detail in the 
full Article. 
In the zealousness to tighten eligibility, little or no consid-
eration was given to the plight of the category of claimants who 
were no longer eligible to receive unemployment benefits. 
Previously that group only served a brief forfeiture period, e.g., 
five to twelve weeks in many states, before receiving benefits. 
Frustration related to the effect of those changes caused a 
noticeable increase in claimants appealing disqualifying 
determinations. Georgia experienced an increase in unemploy-
ment benefit appeals after its changes in 1987, just as other 
states had earlier when similar changes in their own state's 
eligibility conditions were made. Although it is difficult to 
calculate how many of the increased appeals were borne out 
of frustration or desperation and how many were caused by 
downturns in the economy, nonetheless an increase in the 
ISSUE 1995) Tightening Eligibility Conditions 3 
appeals workload was definite and did not subside proportion-
ately when the economy improved. 
Unfortunately for purposes of this study, the demographics 
of those who presumably suffered from the changes in eligibility 
conditions were not captured separately as a defined group 
within the unemployment insurance system. The effect of 
changes in eligibility conditions on certain groups of workers 
could not be examined for that reason. Certain assumptions can 
nonetheless be made safely. One assumption is that those in 
the lower economic strata were affected the most, mostly 
minorities and women. This assumption is attributable primarily 
to the level of personal savings typically accumulated by 
different income groups. It is also attributable to the phenome-
non known as "last hired, first fired". Another assumption is 
that higher paying jobs frequently provide more lucrative 
termination packages than do lower paying jobs. Disqualifica-
tions for those who previously would have been eligible for 
benefits obviously caused a depletion of personal savings and 
increased reliance on public welfare systems. 
A careful comparison of states' unemployment trust fund 
balances in relation to changes.in eligibility conditions shows 
the overall effect of tightening state law eligibility conditions 
has not achieved its purpose of having a significant effect on 
trust fund reserves, despite overall, gradual increases in trust 
fund balances. While most states' trust funds are in relatively 
good condition at present, the solvency of those funds is 
attributable mostly to the overall strength of the economy over 
the past two decades. The projected savings attributable to these 
new policies represent only a small portion of trust fund 
balances. Likewise, payouts are determined primarily through 
the function of the number of claims filed rather than the 
number or percentage of disqualifications. Perhaps the most 
positive impact of the changes is the perception that unemploy-
ment compensatiort should be paid only to the most deserving 
and is not intended as a type of welfare system for individuals 
who contributed directly to their own unemployment by their 
own voluntary actions. 
Can we continue to fund increases in the maximum weekly 
benefit amount through changes in eligibility conditions? In most 
states the answer is a simple no. The progressive tightening 
of eligibility conditions has left few areas to tighten. Those 
remaining areas cannot be expected to produce significant 
savings in terms of payouts without risking defeat of the major 
4 Unive-rsity of Michigan Journal of Law Refonn [SPECIAL 
premise behind the unemployment compensation program: To 
pay benefits to individuals who are unemployed through no fault 
of their own. Future increases in weekly benefit amounts must 
necessarily be a direct drain on trust fund reserves. Most states' 
trust funds can handle this pressure, despite suggestions to the 
contrary from the federal government. Some states with 
legitimate concerns about the effect on future trust fund reserves 
will be forced to discover other creative ways to offset the 
inflation caused by increased weekly benefit amounts or 
otherwise risk widening the delicate gap between replacement 
benefits and previous earnings. 
